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Abstract
The paper addresses a prima facie tension between two popular views about con-
cepts. The first is the doctrine that some concepts are constitutively perceptual/expe-
riential, so that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced subjects. This is 
a classic empiricist theme, but its most conspicuous recent appearance is in literature 
on phenomenal concepts. The second view is anti-individualism: here, the view that 
concept possession depends not only on a thinker’s internal states and relations to 
the concepts’ referents, but also on certain of her relations to sociolinguistic peers. 
In recent works, Derek Ball and Michael Tye have in effect argued that the doctrines 
are incompatible, and their conclusion is that no concepts depend on experience. In 
reply, Bénédicte Veillet endorses those authors’ incompatibilism, but argues that it 
is anti-individualism (about the concepts at issue) that we should reject. I develop 
an approach to reconciliation that is more promising than any considered by these 
theorists. Against Veillet, I defend a version of anti-individualism about phenomenal 
concepts, but against Ball and Tye, I argue that they can be possessed only by suit-
ably experienced thinkers.
My project is to resolve a prima facie tension between two popular views about con-
cepts. The first is that some concepts are constitutively perceptual or experiential, 
in a sense that implies that they can be possessed only by suitably experienced sub-
jects. This is a classic empiricist doctrine, but its most conspicuous recent appear-
ance is in literature on phenomenal concepts. The second view is anti-individualism, 
which says (roughly) that the concepts a thinker possesses can depend not only on 
her internal states and her relations to the concepts’ referents, but also on certain of 
her relations to sociolinguistic peers. Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) argue, in effect, 
that the doctrines are incompatible and they conclude that no concepts depend on 
experience. In reply, Veillet (2012) endorses Ball and Tye’s incompatibilism but 
argues that it is anti-individualism (about the concepts at issue) that we should 
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reject. In this paper I defend an approach to reconciliation that is more promising 
than those considered by these authors.
In Sects. 1 and 2 I elaborate the two doctrines in turn, and in Sect. 3 I examine the 
debate between Ball/Tye and Veillet. In Sect. 4 I develop my approach to reconcili-
ation, and finally in Sect. 5 I work through the consequences of this. Against Veillet 
I defend anti-individualism about phenomenal concepts, but against Ball and Tye I 
argue that they are only possessed by suitably experienced thinkers.
1  The Experience‑Dependency of Phenomenal Concepts
Locke and Hume held that certain ideas of colours and sounds cannot be entertained 
by the congenitally blind and deaf.1 But in contemporary philosophy of mind, the 
most conspicuous advocates of the doctrine that certain concepts are experience-
dependent are found in the literature on phenomenal concepts (PCs). According to 
‘PC-theorists’—these are concepts which pick out (types of) phenomenal qualities 
from the first-person, introspective perspective, and so seem to afford a distinctively 
direct way of thinking about those qualities. Some authors construe this in epistemic 
terms, holding that possession of PCs involves acquaintance with phenomenal qual-
ities, and that this may be difficult to reconcile with physicalism.2 On the other hand, 
many PC-theorists maintain that the directness at issue is not epistemic but merely 
semantic, and indeed, that reflection on PCs’ distinctively direct semantics provides 
resources sufficient to rebut influential anti-physicalist arguments.3
To understand the arguments to come below, we need a sense of how this con-
ception of direct reference relates to theories of concepts in general. For illustrative 
purposes let’s assume that these theories fall into two kinds. According to the first 
kind of theory—covariational theory, concepts are states/properties (of persons, or 
their brains) whose tokenings or activations co-vary with the perceptual or linguis-
tic salience to their possessors of the concepts’ referents (or instantiations of their 
referents/elements of their extensions). Of course, not all correspondences are taken 
to be constitutive of concept possession: advocates of simple covariational theories 
identify the relevant ones as those which occur in normal or optimal conditions, 
while more sophisticated theories incorporate alternative ways to designate the 
canonical ones.4 Meanwhile according to the second—inferential/conceptual role 
theory—concepts are individuated by their positions in the networks of inferences 
which their possessors are disposed to make—again, in conditions that are normal 
1 See e.g. Locke (1975, §II.2, ‘Of simple ideas’: pp. 99–100); Hume (2008, §II, ‘Of the origin of ideas’: 
p. 98).
2 This claim is made explicitly by Levene (2007, p. 162–165), Nida-Rümelin (2007, p. 307) and Goff 
(2011), but it is, arguably, implicit in much influential anti-physicalist work, e.g. Jackson (1986) and 
Chalmers (1996).
3 Prominent advocates of this physicalist ‘PC strategy’ include Loar (1990/97, 2003), Sturgeon (1994), 
Papineau (1998, 2002, 2007), Perry (2001), Lycan (1996), Balog (2012) and, in work that predates the 
antithetical line considered below, Tye (1999, 2003).
4 See e.g. Dretske (1981) and Fodor (1980/90, 1998). Versions of this approach are sometimes labelled 
indicator or informational semantics.
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or optimal or designated as canonical in some other way.5 Although there are obvi-
ous differences between these two kinds of theories of concepts, many theorists 
appropriate elements of both.
PC-theorists characterize the distinctive semantics they claim PCs to exhibit by 
contrasting them with concepts whose reference is mediated by (contingently exhib-
ited) properties of the concepts’ referents/extensions. E.g. we think of water as wet, 
transparent, thirst-quenching etc.—and even if these properties don’t constitute the 
meaning of the term ‘water’ or the content of the associated concept, water, they 
serve to fix the referent/extension6 of those representations, so they play an impor-
tant semantic role. In contrast, it’s claimed, by exploiting the introspective perspec-
tive, PCs of what it’s like to see colours, suffer pains, etc. refer to those phenomenal 
qualities in a way that’s not mediated by reference-fixing descriptive information. A 
consequence of this emphasised by the physicalist PC-theorists is that propositions 
incorporating these concepts are not a priori connected to propositions couched in 
physical/scientific terms (or at any rate, are not so connected in virtue of the PCs 
they contain). And according to these philosophers, this suffices to explain away the 
epistemic data exploited by anti-physicalist arguments (e.g. that it’s conceivable that 
there are zombies, and that science will never explain why experiences exhibit their 
phenomenal qualities).7
The contentions that PCs refer directly and are conceptually isolated make clear 
that PC-theorists endorse a version of covariational theory of such concepts, rather 
than an inferential role one. On straightforward versions, the direct relation between 
a PC and its referent is assumed to be causal. But on other accounts, it is held to be 
one of incorporation/constitution.8
So far in this section I’ve not mentioned the contention that a subject’s posses-
sion of a PC depends on her having had a relevant experience. Indeed, I’m not sure 
whether this is an essential component of PC-theory, or, if it is, precisely how strong 
we should take the modal notion of dependence it incorporates to be. But in some 
form at least, it’s an extremely natural and attractive assumption for a PC-theorist 
to make, and some of the more detailed accounts of PCs offered by PC-theorists 
rely on it.9 PC-theorists propose that typical thinkers acquire their PCs through 
acts of introspective attention and that these introspective acts fix the PCs’ refer-
ences. Many stop short of an insistence that possession of a PC without relevant 
experience is impossible—e.g. Tye (1999, p. 712) concedes that a subject might 
acquire a PC through brain surgery or a miracle, and Papineau (2002, §2.8) suggests 
5 See e.g. Harman (1973, 1987), Peacocke (1992), Brandom (1994) and Greenberg and Harman (2006).
6 Words in small capitals denote concepts. For brevity I’ll generally omit the word ‘extension’ hence-
forth, and stick to ‘referent’. I don’t mean this to imply any substantial assumptions about the semantic 
values of predicate expressions and the concepts they express.
7 For a defence of the view that PCs are in this sense ‘topic-neutral’ against a recent attack, see my 
(2016).
8 Tye (1999, 2003) is a good example of the causal approach. Papineau (1998, 2002, 2007) and Balog 
(2012) develop constitutional ones. Elements of both are anticipated in Loar’s pioneering (1990/97).
9 E.g, Loar (1990/97, 2003) construes them as ‘recognitional’, where recognition is understood in terms 
of perception/introspection of relevant instances of the concepts’ referents.
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that experience-dependency is ‘a quite contingent matter’—but these concessions 
involve exotic cases: caveats to the doctrine that all normal thinkers with PCs have 
had relevant experiences. Moreover, although the claim that PCs refer directly is 
the one that plays the most important role in physicalist PC-theorists’ responses to 
anti-physicalist arguments, the experience-dependency claim features prominently 
in their response to one of them—Jackson’s knowledge argument. And the scenario 
envisaged in the course of that argument is often invoked to illustrate claims about 
PCs. The physicalists concede to Jackson that while confined to her monochrome 
room, Mary cannot know what it’s like to see red, but they contend that this is not 
because what it’s like is non-physical. They propose, rather, that it’s because—not 
having had the relevant experience—she lacks a requisite experience-dependent 
PC.10
Although PC-theorists suppose that PCs are acquired through acts of introspec-
tive attention to token experiences, they assume that the concepts’ referents are 
phenomenal types. They assume, moreover, that the PCs survive the experiences’ 
cessation: coffee drinkers can think in the relevant way about what it’s like to taste 
coffee long after the cup is empty. Furthermore, although they assume that PCs are 
acquired through episodes of demonstrative attention, most theorists agree that in 
general, referents of PCs do not vary with context of use, and so are not demonstra-
tive/indexical concepts.
It deserves emphasis that the claim here is that because PCs refer directly, they 
are not equivalent to any descriptive concepts. E.g., according to PC-theorists, the 
PC of phenomenal red that Mary acquires on her release is importantly distinct 
even from the co-referring descriptive concepts she might express with phrases 
like, ‘what it’s like to see red’ and ‘the property that others call “phenomenal red”’. 
Before her first visual colour experience, Mary knew plenty about colours, and used 
the word ‘red’ to express a colour concept. She also knew what it was like to see 
shades of grey, and what myriad other experiences were like, so she had the general 
concept phenomenal experience. Hence, before her first visual colour experience she 
might well have used a phrase like ‘what it’s like to see red’, to express a descriptive 
content which PC-theorists insist is distinct from the co-referring PC she acquires 
later. I’m not sure whether PC-theorists would say that the concept pre-release Mary 
expressed by the word ‘red’ is connected to descriptive information in the way they 
suggest concepts like water are; or indeed, whether it’s the same as the concept that 
normally-experienced thinkers express with ‘red’, but irrespective of these issues, 
PC-theorists certainly maintain that this colour concept is distinct from the PC of 
phenomenal red which she acquires on her release.
A final preliminary matter which is relevant to my argument below concerns 
whether, if PCs are non-indexical/demonstrative and non-descriptive, we should 
presume them to be expressed in natural language, and if so, by what words? Mary 
is often represented as reporting her transformative experience with an exclamation 
such as, ‘So that’s what it’s like to see red!’, but should PC-theorists suppose that 
10 Ball (2009) argues that the experience-dependency claim plays a crucial role in the knowledge argu-
ment as well as in the physicalist rejoinder.
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any of the terms in that sentence express her newly-acquired PC? We have already 
seen that they ought not to assume that her phrase, ‘what it’s like to see red’ does, 
as it is descriptive, and expresses a content Mary might well have entertained before 
her release from the room. Next, the PC-theorist ought not to think that her, ‘red’ 
expresses the PC either, since red is a property of external objects, not of experi-
ences, and moreover, seems also to express a concept she possessed before release 
from the room. Perhaps the most plausible suggestion is that her ‘that’ expresses the 
PC: but if this is correct, it involves a non-standard use of the term, since ‘that’ is 
more usually a demonstrative/indexical expression whose referent varies with con-
text of use.11 Similar reflections seem true of words and phrases like ‘pain’, ‘what 
it’s like to suffer pain’, etc.
At this point, the PC-theorist might suggest that even if the concepts expressed by 
words like ‘red’ and ‘pain’ are not exclusively phenomenal, they may have phenom-
enal components, at least when used by ordinarily-experienced subjects (as opposed 
to Mary and her ilk). Perhaps the concepts red and pain are complex, with functional 
or descriptive components (so that e.g. (to illustrate) they might be related, respec-
tively, to colour and unpleasant) but also phenomenal components. This possibility 
suggests a refinement of our focus: if concepts like red and pain are complexes with 
phenomenal components, then what we’re really interested in are those components, 
and the PC-theorist can be expected to hive these off for separate discussion. Fol-
lowing Chalmers (2003, p. 225), let’s use the label ‘pure PC’s for these putative 
non-descriptive, non-indexical conceptual units which pick out phenomenal quali-
ties ‘directly, in terms of [their] intrinsic phenomenal nature’ and whose references 
are fixed through acts of introspective attention to phenomenal qualities.
Should PC-theorists suppose that there are words that exclusively express pure 
PCs, as opposed to complexes with (perhaps) phenomenal components? A negative 
answer has some independent appeal. When trying to explain to friends, students 
etc. what we mean by ‘phenomenal qualities’, many of us struggle to find the right 
words. One finds oneself resorting to emphasized (and, I’ve suggested, non-standard 
uses of) demonstratives (‘I mean pain’s feeling like this’ or ‘what Mary expresses 
with “That is what it’s like to see red”’).
Although I think this is an important suggestion12 it’s hard to resist an obvious 
rejoinder. Even if we don’t already have words for pure PCs, subjects with such 
concepts could simply introduce neologisms for them by stipulation. It is difficult 
to deny that this is possible, since we have the terms we need to articulate such 
stipulations. Thus, a thinker could fix the referent of a neologism, ‘red*’, with the 
11 Note that if one can express a PC with a non-standard use of ‘that’, one might also do it with a ref-
erential use of the description, ‘what it’s like to see red’: but this use would also be non-standard. The 
point remains that the expressed concept is not descriptive.
12 The idea that phenomenal contents are not linguistically expressed is not new: Alex Byrne (2002) and 
Benj Hellie (2004) do not use the terminology of ‘PCs’ etc., but in effect, both respond to the knowledge 
argument by arguing that what Mary learns is ineffable. Block (1996) is also sympathetic. (Byrne (2002) 
provides useful references to earlier advocates.) Notice that even if PCs are not linguistically expressed, 
they can still be held to play many of the roles in thinking that PC-theorists assign them. The problems 
about consciousness which preoccupy PC-theorists concern thought, not language.
 D. Byrne 
1 3
resolution expressed by ‘henceforth I’ll use “red*” to express this (phenomenal 
type)’—while deploying his pure PC. And his subsequent uses of ‘red*’ might then 
express that PC, rather than any descriptive or indexical concept.13
2  Anti‑individualism
One feature that many covariational theories of concepts share with many inferen-
tial role theories is a commitment to individualism: a characterization of a subject’s 
concepts in terms of features of her—albeit features that may include her relations 
to the concepts’ referents. In contrast, anti-individualism (a.k.a. social externalism) 
proposes that thinkers who fail to satisfy some of the conditions in terms of which 
the covariation and inferential role theories identify concepts can qualify nonethe-
less as possessing them in virtue of certain relations to others in their sociolinguistic 
communities.14
The most influential arguments for anti-individualism issue from Tyler Burge’s 
(1979) famous story of Al, the mostly-competent user of the term ‘arthritis’ who 
sincerely asserts to his doctor, ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’. When Al’s doctor cor-
rects him by explaining that arthritis is a condition one can only have in joints, he 
accepts the correction—accepts on the basis of the doctor’s authority that he mis-
used the term ‘arthritis’. There are two ways in which we might interpret Al’s think-
ing. First, we could suggest that before being corrected by the doctor, he used the 
term ‘arthritis’ to express an idiosyncratic concept—tharthritis—which picks out 
a (possible but non-actual) medical condition which is like arthritis except that one 
can have it in the thigh as well as in joints. On this interpretation, Al expressed a 
true belief when he first spoke to the doctor, but then modified/replaced his idiosyn-
cratic concept on the basis of the doctor’s correction. The second interpretation is 
that the belief Al expressed before the doctor corrected him was the false one that he 
had arthritis in his thigh, and the doctor’s intervention led him to revise this belief, 
but not to modify a concept. This second interpretation commits us to an attribution 
to pre-correction Al of the ordinary concept, arthritis, notwithstanding his miscon-
ception of its referent.
Individualist theories (of both the covariational and inferential role kinds) 
comport with the first interpretation of the Al story, and not with the second. But 
Burge and others argue that the second interpretation fits our ordinary intuitions 
13 The suggestion that subjects might introduce terms for PCs by stipulation is made by Papineau (2002, 
§4.11) and also by Ball (2009, p. 950) and Tye (2009, p. 69). (It resonates mischievously with Wittgen-
stein’s (1953, §258) sceptical discussion of the man who undertakes to record instances of a sensation 
type by writing ‘S’ in his diary whenever tokens of it occur. In the literature on Wittgenstein’s infamous 
Private Language Argument, Edward Craig (1982) defends a version of the stipulation suggestion.).
 In my (MS) I explore a position more sceptical of linguistic expression. To offset the appearance that 
we express phenomenal contents with terms like ‘this’ in the examples above, I consider the possibility 
that such contents might be ‘conveyed’ rather than expressed, in a manner in some ways akin to Gricean 
implicature.
14 Thus, as I’ll emphasize below, the variety of semantic externalism in focus here is the sociolinguistic 
one associated especially with Burge, and not the distinct variety promoted by Putnam, Kripke, etc.
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and attributive practice better than the first. They argue, moreover, that the way 
in which the first interpretation involves two concepts (arthritis and tharthritis) 
instead of one generates implausible consequences about mundane beliefs, such as 
are expressed by sentences which Al does not misuse, e.g. ‘Arthritis is painful’. Indi-
vidualism implies that either (1) before the doctor’s intervention, Al did not have the 
belief which the doctor expresses with that sentence (because he lacked a requisite 
concept); or (2) the doctor uses the sentence (at different times) to express two dis-
tinct beliefs—the one he shared with pre-correction Al, and the one he shares with 
post-correction Al (and many others). Anti-individualists urge that neither (1) nor 
(2) is plausible, so we should favour the one-concept interpretation.
We can formulate the anti-individualist position in the terms used above by say-
ing that before the conversation with his doctor, Al possessed the concept arthritis 
even though he did not fully satisfy the covariational or inferentialist conditions in 
whose terms individualist theories characterize concept possession. Burge’s presen-
tation suggests that the relevant conditions Al fails to satisfy are inferentialist ones: 
it’s assumed that his assent to the sentence, ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ is evidence 
that some of the inferences Al is disposed to make between (propositions contain-
ing) arthritis and thigh are at odds with those in terms of which inferentialist 
individualist theory would characterize possession of arthritis. As I’ll illustrate in 
Sects. 4 and 5 below, we can also formulate versions of Burge’s thought experiment 
which engage more directly with covariational individualist theories by involving 
relations between between concepts/terms and their referents rather than inferential 
relations between concepts/terms.
The above is a rather schematic illustration of anti-individualism, but it’s enough 
to indicate the way in which its advocates characterize concept possession in inter-
personal terms. The key point is that Al is disposed to defer to his doctor over use of 
the term ‘arthritis’, because he acknowledges that the doctor’s conception of arthritis 
is more accurate or complete than his. It’s a good (and under-explored) question how 
exactly this mechanism of interpersonal deference is supposed to work.15 For us, an 
important point to emphasize is that the proposal is not that what Al expresses with 
the term ‘arthritis’ is a metalinguistic content such as he might express by ‘the dis-
ease my doctor calls “arthritis”’. Rather, the claim is that, in some implicit/automatic 
way, deference affords Al a way to piggyback on his doctor’s superior conception.
On the other hand, anti-individualists don’t generally think that a disposition to 
defer over the use of a term is sufficient for concept possession. Burge emphasises 
that Al is a generally competent user of ‘arthritis’—i.e. most of his uses align with 
others’—and I assume that the significance of this, in the terms introduced above, 
is as evidence that he satisfies some (perhaps most) of the conditions in terms of 
which individualist theories characterize concept possession.16 Many philosophers 
15 See Greenberg (2014) for a plausibly pessimistic but fertile discussion.
16 Burge (1979, p. 91) notes that we should not attribute the concept orang-utan to a subject who 
believed that ‘orang-utan’ picks out a kind of drink. Moreover, if the only occurrences of ‘arthritis’ that 
ever occurred in sentences asserted by Al were opaque occurrences in sentences attributing attitudes 
about the disease to the doctor, our inclination might well be to attribute to Al the metalinguistic content 
suggested above rather than arthritis. (For related discussion, see Sect. 5 below.).
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who are broadly sympathetic to covariational or inferential role theories accept that 
deference can also play a role. Thus, just as many theorists endorse elements of both 
covariational and inferential role theories of concepts, many more seem to endorse 
accounts that combine elements of both covariational/inferential role theories and 
anti-individualism. It’s a good (and, again, under-explored17) question just how this 
compromise is supposed to work. I assume the rough idea (and one that will suffice 
for my purposes here) is that to possess a concept, a thinker has to meet (or come 
close to meeting) some of the conditions associated with individualist approaches, 
but that shortcomings in their satisfaction of these can be compensated for by suita-
ble inclinations to defer. E.g. it seems plausible that to qualify as possessing arthri-
tis, Al needs to be disposed to endorse some pertinent inferences, (e.g. from arthri-
tis to disease) and/or to enjoy some relevant causal relations to instances of arthritis, 
even if the misconception evidenced by his assent to, ‘I have arthritis in my thigh’ is 
off-set by his deference to a medical expert.
Two further qualifications are in order before we return to the phenomenal case. 
First, it’s worth pointing out that even if our intuitions accord with Burge’s over 
familiar examples like the one just rehearsed, the case they support is at best an 
inference-to-the-best-explanation of the data codified in those intuitions: it was 
never going to be a conclusive knock-down argument for anti-individualism about 
relevant concepts.18 (I return to the question of how to evaluate Burgean arguments 
in Sect. 4.)
Second, notice that Burgean anti-individualism is quite different from the variety 
of semantic externalism about the meanings of terms like ‘water’ defended by Put-
nam (1975) and Kripke (1980)—and the differences matter here. On the Putnam/
Kripke view, the environmental features on which linguistic meanings (and, let’s 
assume, conceptual contents) depend are natural (usually chemical/structural) prop-
erties of the terms’ referents; whereas on the anti-individualist picture, the relevant 
environmental features are sociolinguistic. The conception of direct reference pro-
moted by PC-theorists certainly suggests a version of Putnam/Kripke externalism 
about those concepts,19 but whether PC-theorists should also endorse Burgean anti-
individualism about them is moot.
3  PCs Without Experience?
In the previous section, I explained the anti-individualist proposal that thinkers 
whose conceptions of concepts’ referents are inaccurate or incomplete can qualify 
as possessing the concepts in virtue of their inclinations to defer to peers whom they 
recognize to be more authoritative. Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) argue that the same 
17 Though again, see Greenberg (2014).
18 Ball (2009, p. 954) appears to agree: ‘Burge’s arguments do not show that his opponent’s view is inco-
herent, but that it is implausible.’
19 That is, it suggests that the contents at issue depend on their referents, though perhaps in this case not 
that they ‘ain’t in the head’!
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is true of introspective concepts of phenomenal qualities. Moreover, they maintain, 
if a thinker can possess those concepts in the deferential way, then she can possess 
them without having had relevant experiences, so such concepts are not experience-
dependent. They defend their contention dramatically in terms of Jackson’s Mary. 
After Mary is released from the room, she can converse with her peers about phe-
nomenal red. All parties agree that whatever words and concepts the others use to 
do this, post-release Mary can use too. But now, surely she could have learned the 
word that expresses the relevant concept—and so come deferentially to possess that 
concept—before her release. The PC-theorist must deny this, holding that before her 
release she possessed no more than a non-phenomenal, impoverished version of the 
concept (or a different concept). But Ball and Tye argue that this is as implausible as 
the individualist’s contention that before being corrected by his doctor, Al possessed 
the idiosyncratic concept, tharthritis.
Veillet (2012) has responded to the Ball/Tye argument, defending the individual-
ist, two-concept interpretation of Mary’s case against their Burgean critique.20 In 
this section I examine this debate. As we’ll see, Veillet’s response to Ball and Tye 
is effective: their argument against the two-concept interpretation of Mary is unper-
suasive. However, Veillet provides no reason to favour an individualist interpretation 
of the concepts at issue: so the question whether thinkers can possess these concepts 
in the deferential way remains open. In Sect. 4 I develop a more plausible version 
of anti-individualism about these concepts than the one considered by Ball and Tye, 
but in Sect. 5 I argue that even on this conception, such concepts are experience-
dependent. (So the position I defend is distinct from both of those championed by 
these authors.)
A complication that makes this a little difficult to excavate fairly is that to avoid 
begging the question against Ball and Tye, we had better not call the controversial 
concepts ‘PCs’. As I explained in Sect. 1, the thesis that PCs are experience-depend-
ent may not be essential to PC-theory, but it’s widely endorsed by PC-theorists, and 
by attacking it, Ball and Tye take themselves to be arguing that (to quote the title 
of Ball (2009)) ‘There are no Phenomenal Concepts’. On the other hand Ball and 
Tye don’t deny that thinkers have introspective concepts of phenomenal proper-
ties21—their contention is simply that such concepts are not experience-dependent. 
So we need a neutral term for concepts which pick out phenomenal qualities from 
20 Alter (2013) has responded to Ball and Tye’s argument in a different way. He argues that while it may 
be conceded that pre-release Mary possesses the relevant PC, she does not at that time master it, and 
moreover, that it is mastery and not possession that matters to the arguments pertaining to the metaphys-
ics of consciousness. Ball (2013) has replied, arguing, inter alia, that even if mere possession is in some 
sense thinner than full mastery, pre-release Mary’s mere possession of the relevant concept suffices for 
her to know what it’s like to see red.
21 E.g. Tye (2009, p. 56) characterises a kind of concept with whose existence he has no quibble as 
‘those concepts we use in thoughts or judgements formed on the basis of introspection of phenomenal 
character of our phenomenal states’. And in the course of Ball’s defence of his view that Mary could pos-
sess a concept of the relevant kind by deference, he considers what she expresses, upon her release, with 
the sentence, ‘That is what it’s like to see red’, and explains that in that sentence, ‘“That” refers to an 
experience of red, to which Mary is attending in introspection, or to some feature of such an experience’ 
(2009, p. 947).
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the introspective perspective but are not defined as experience-dependent. From here 
on I’ll use the term ‘introspective concepts’ (IC), leaving it implicit that the referents 
in the cases of interest here are phenomenal. I’ll also assume that the ICs at issue are 
‘pure’ in the sense introduced in Sect. 1—i.e. that their referents are exclusively phe-
nomenal. (My usage here implies a concession to Tye and Ball that a concept could 
be introspective without being experience-dependent; and one might worry that this 
begs the question not just against the doctrine that ICs are experience-dependent, but 
also against any conception that regards such concepts as essentially tied to percep-
tion. But as long as anti-individualism remains in the running this can be avoided. 
For if a thinker can possess an IC in the deferential way, then even if its possession 
does not require her to have had introspective contact with its referent (so that it is 
not experience-dependent in the sense characterized in Sect. 1) the concept may yet 
be experience-dependent in the weaker sense that it requires (either her or) some of 
the thinkers to whom she defers (or the ones to whom they defer, etc.) to have had 
such contact (so that the concept might still be regarded as essentially perceptual.)
Another preliminary question concerns the terms that are used to express these 
concepts. Ball and Tye run their arguments using terms like ‘red’, and ‘what it’s 
like to experience red’; but for the reasons I suggested in Sect. 1, this is misleading: 
neither of those terms, at least when used in standard ways, is a plausible candidate 
for expression of a (pure) PC or an IC. An advocate of the view that such concepts 
are not expressed in natural languages at all would have an obvious rejoinder to the 
Ball/Tye argument, since the medium through which anti-individualists propose that 
concepts can be deferentially possessed is linguistic; but in response to this (and as I 
suggested in Sect. 1) Ball (2009, pp. 949–951) and Tye (2009, pp. 69–70) argue that 
a speaker might simply introduce a term for such a concept by stipulation. And they 
insist (plausibly) that their arguments would be equally effective if transposed into 
neologistic terms. In light of this I’ll follow Veillet (2012, p. 102) and use a neolo-
gism: ‘red*’.
In these terms, then, we envisage Mary using the term ‘red*’ before and after her 
release form the monochrome room in discussions with better-experienced peers. 
Orthodox PC-theorists have to hold that Mary expresses two concepts with this—an 
austere, non-phenomenal one which she utilizes before her release from the room, 
and the full-blooded PC that she comes to deploy after it. Let’s ask which of these 
concepts Mary’s more experienced interlocutors expressed in conversations with her 
before her release. Perhaps they didn’t possess the austere non-phenomenal concept 
which Mary does, in which case their earlier discussions with Mary involved equiv-
ocation. Or perhaps they did possess the austere non-phenomenal concept as well as 
the richer PC, and they used ‘red*’ to express each of them on different occasions. 
Tye and Ball assume that the PC-theorist will opt for the second possibility (and 
Veillet agrees) but they argue that the two-concept picture it delivers is implausible.
First, they maintain, ordinarily experienced subjects are not introspectively aware 
that they possess pairs of concepts of this sort, and that the associated words are 
ambiguous. Moreover, the picture has further implausible consequences. E.g., if we 
suppose that before release, Mary thought, ‘I have not experienced red*’, and after, 
she thinks ‘I have experienced red*’, advocates of the two-concept interpretation 
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must deny that these two thoughts contradict one another (since according to them, 
‘red*’ expresses distinct concepts in the two sentences)—and this is implausible. 
According to Ball and Tye, it’s better to suppose that only one concept is involved 
here. And since it seems that Mary possessed this concept before her first colour 
experience, it cannot be experience-dependent.
In response to this, Veillet (2012) defends the two-concept interpretation. To 
illustrate, she compares Mary to Annie, a novice astronomer who uses ‘Hesperus’ 
to express the concept Hesperus, but who does not possess the concept, Phosphorus. 
One day, Annie is introduced to the name, ‘Phosphorus’ by being told (only) that 
it refers to Hesperus, and she proceeds to use the name ‘Phosphorus’ in conversa-
tions with other astronomers. According to Veillet, the fact that Annie has become 
familiar with the term, ‘Phosphorus’ is not a reason to suppose that she now pos-
sesses the concept it is used by others to express—it’s more plausible, she suggests, 
to suppose that Annie uses it to express a concept she already has, e.g. Hesperus.22 
And so, Veillet argues, the fact that Mary can use the term ‘red*’ while in the room 
is not a definitive reason to suppose that she uses it at that time to express the same 
concept as her more experienced peers and her later self. A plausible alternative is 
that she uses it to express a co-referring non-phenomenal concept. Veillet’s label for 
this is ‘red phenomenal character’: it is (I assume) what I have been describing as 
a descriptive concept of a phenomenal quality—something like the one that, I sug-
gested in Sect. 1, is expressed by the phrase, ‘what it’s like to see red’.
This allows Veillet to respond to the considerations raised by Ball and Tye against 
the two-concept interpretation. Since we don’t need to interpret pre-release Mary 
as using ‘red*’ to express the PC it’s normally used to express, it is not implausible 
to interpret her pre-release utterance of ‘I have not experienced red*’ as consistent 
with her post-release declaration, ‘I have experienced red*’. Veillet also replies to 
Ball and Tye’s argument that ordinarily-experienced thinkers are not introspectively 
aware of using terms like ‘red*’ to express more than one concept. She argues that 
this is because, generally-speaking, they do not do so. Even if experienced subjects 
possess the austere concept that pre-release Mary expresses with ‘red*’, they might 
never have reason to express it (with that term or any other).
4  A More Prosaic Case
Veillet’s careful analysis establishes that there’s nothing incoherent about the 
two-concept interpretation that orthodox PC-theorists need to give of the Mary 
scenario: so she provides a coherent way for individualists about ICs to rebut the 
Ball/Tye argument against PCs. On the other hand, the one-concept interpretation 
22 As will emerge, I agree with Veillet that we have little reason to suppose that Annie uses ‘Phosphorus’ 
to express phosphorus; but for what it’s worth, I don’t think it’s especially plausible that what she uses it 
to express is hesperus. Given the role that ‘Phosphorus’ is likely to have in her thinking, I think it’s much 
more plausible that it expresses something like ‘the planet that astronomers call “Hesperus”’. (For more 
on metalinguistic examples like this, see Sect. 5 below.).
 D. Byrne 
1 3
championed by Ball and Tye is also coherent: Veillet offers no positive reasons to 
prefer the two-concept one. So the position we’re left in is more of a stalemate than 
a defence of individualism about ICs.
Let’s look a little closer at the dialectical structure of Burgean arguments for anti-
individualism about concepts of a given kind. As I observed in Sect.  2, these are 
never ‘knock down’: they’re a variety of inference-to-the-best-explanation. We’re 
told a story about a thinker, and invited to agree that the most compelling interpre-
tation of it involves a single concept she shares with others, as opposed to a pair of 
concepts (one shared and one idiosyncratic)—even though the thinker fails to satisfy 
some of the conditions in terms of which individualist theories characterize posses-
sion of the (shared) concept. Hence, evaluation of a Burgean argument boils down to 
a weighing of two things against one another. On one side we have the interpretative 
intuitions elicited by the story, and on the other is our commitment to the mooted 
individualist possession conditions.
As we saw in Sect.  2, we can think of Burge’s famous argument as involving 
putative individualist possession conditions (for arthritis) that are inferential, and 
which seem not quite to be met by a thinker who assents to the sentence, ‘I have 
arthritis in my thigh’. When we turn our attention to PCs (and to related concepts 
like red) we shift our attention to covariational candidates for the role of relevant 
mooted individualist possession condition, for as we saw in Sect.  1, PC-theorists 
typically endorse covariation theories of these concepts rather than inferentiallist 
ones. Thus, the relevant idiosyncrasy exhibited by Mary is that she is not related to 
instantiations of red* in the (introspective) way that more typical thinkers are; and 
this is relevant because a typical individualist theory of red* would characterize its 
possession in terms of a thinker’s relation to instances of red*. More specifically, as 
we saw in Sect. 1, PC-theorists characterize possession PCs as essentially involving 
distinctively introspective causal—or perhaps even constitutive—relations to experi-
ences exhibiting them, and the crucial point here is that Mary’s lack of experience 
provides very strong evidence that she fails to meet one of these individualist condi-
tions. The upshot here is that if it is to persuade us to repudiate orthodox PC-theory, 
the Burgean argument has to offer a story of which the one-concept interpretation 
elicits a stronger pull than the assumption that red* has this (experience-involving) 
individualist possession condition.
This suggests a way in which to resolve the stalemate in the PC-theorist’s favour, 
in light of Veillet’s discussion. The theory of PCs (some key elements of which I 
outlined in Sect. 1) is intuitively and theoretically appealing. If the pull it elicits is 
stronger than the inclination to adopt Ball and Tye’s one-concept interpretation of 
the Mary story, we’re justified in continuing to believe it. And by demonstrating the 
availability of a coherent two-concept interpretation, Veillet’s discussion deflates the 
appeal of the one-concept one, to some degree at least.
One reservation about this is that the view defended by Veillet—combining as it 
does individualism about a small rarefied class of concepts and anti-individualism 
about all the rest—is a rather disunified, inelegant theory of intentionality. More 
importantly, I think we can do better than the qualified resolution just considered. 
Below I’ll defend a version of the Burgean argument for anti-individualism about 
ICs that we have not yet considered. If this did not suggest itself in the previous 
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section, this is because our focus there was on such an exotic case. In this section I’ll 
consider a subject whose predicament is much more prosaic than Mary’s. However, 
the version of anti-individualism about ICs I’ll defend is consistent with the conten-
tion that ICs are experience-dependent, and in Sect. 5 I’ll defend that contention. So 
while the position I’ll develop opposes Veillet’s, it also opposes Ball and Tye’s.
In the previous section I noted that Ball and Tye illustrate their main argument 
by envisaging Mary and her peers using terms like ‘red’, and ‘what it’s like to see 
red’ instead of philosophers’ neologisms like ‘red*’. I complained that this is mis-
leading—since they’re poor candidates for terms we might take to express ICs—
and I followed Veillet in sanitizing the discussion by replacing those terms with the 
neologism. However, an important part of the standard argument for anti-individu-
alism about any concept is the lemma that fairly competent speakers can misapply 
it, and then accept correction from others whom they recognize as more authorita-
tive. (This is the part of the argument that suggests the thinker’s failure to satisfy a 
mooted individualist possession condition.) Ball and Tye defend instances of this 
lemma in various ways: in this section I want to focus on one (on which they touch 
only briefly) which involves a more prosaic scenario than Mary’s, but in which the 
use of words like ‘red’ is neither misleading nor dispensable.
Ball (2009, p. 951) and Tye (2009, pp. 63–65) point out that some speakers sys-
tematically misapply ‘red’ to objects which are not red and ‘pain’ to experiences 
that are not painful, and they reflect that many such speakers are happy to accept 
correction when these errors are pointed out to them, much as Al accepts correction 
from his doctor.23 As I’ve emphasized, these terms don’t express ICs (or at least they 
do not exclusively) but Ball and Tye argue that thinkers who are disposed to misap-
ply these terms can be expected also to misapply the related concepts of phenom-
enal qualities: e.g., (in the terms introduced above:) thinkers who misapply red can 
be expected also to misapply red*. And thinkers who accept correction and revise 
earlier applications of red can be expected to do the same in respect of red*. Tye 
pushes this line forcibly:
Anyone who is willing to accept correction as to whether a given shade should 
really be counted as a shade of red should be willing to accept correction as to 
whether a given token experience she is undergoing while viewing that shade 
should properly be counted as having the phenomenal character of experiences 
as of red, assuming that she takes herself to be a normal perceiver in normal 
viewing conditions. (2009, p. 64)
He goes on to argue that a thinker who accepted the first correction but not the sec-
ond would be ‘deeply irrational’. Veillet (2012: 112) takes issue with this line of 
argument. She points out that it’s one thing to concede that a thinker can mistakenly 
believe an experience to correspond to a certain colour, and quite another to con-
cede that she can mistakenly believe it to correspond to a given type of phenomenal 
property. PC-theorists generally agree that a thinker could possess an IC like red* 
23 Burge (1979) also uses colour examples.
 D. Byrne 
1 3
without knowing which colour it is a phenomenal instance of24; so they might well 
hold that a thinker could be prepared to defer over application of a colour concept 
without being prepared to defer over a concept like red*.
In a moment I’ll argue that Veillet’s interpretation of Ball and Tye’s argument 
is uncharitable—but it’s encouraged by carelessness in passages like the one from 
Tye I quoted above. (And as I said, Ball’s and Tye’s presentations of this argument 
are brief). There, Tye considers whether a thinker would ‘accept correction’ over 
whether an experience has ‘the phenomenal character of experiences as of red’ 
(2009, p. 64, italics added) and it’s easy to read that as a question about a descrip-
tive concept which incorporates the colour concept, red—e.g. as about the concept 
Veillet call ‘red phenomenal character’ (which I’ve suggested is expressed by the 
phrase, ‘what it’s like to see red’). And Veillet is right to point out that PC-theorists 
can concede that thinkers might defer over that concept without conceding that they 
might defer over the likes of red*.
But two questions remain. First, might a thinker misapply red*? The Cartesian 
view that first-person phenomenal judgements are infallible has a venerable pedi-
gree, but few contemporary advocates. There’s a constitutive difference between 
undergoing a phenomenal experience and making a phenomenal judgement about 
it, so it should be possible for the two to come apart.25 This invites my second ques-
tion: could circumstances that led a thinker to believe that she had misapplied an IC 
and so to revise an earlier application count as circumstances involving deference of 
the sort relevant to anti-individualism?
To get clear on this, let’s begin with red, and take a closer look at the kind of 
case suggested by Ball’s and Tye’s remarks. Suppose that Alice is a normally-expe-
rienced perceiver who mistakenly describes a certain area of a painting as ‘red’. 
Shortly afterwards, her description is challenged by Bob, who knows that the area in 
question was orange. Alice recognizes that Bob is a better colour taxonomizer than 
her, and so she accepts his correction. For familiar Burgean reasons, it seems natural 
to attribute a single concept, red, to Alice both before and after correction—and so 
to accept that her possession of that concept is (at least in part) deferential. To get 
extra clear on this, let’s put it in the explanatory terms I used in Sect. 2 and earlier 
in this section. It seems that Alice fails at least to some degree to satisfy a condition 
in terms of which an individualist would characterize possession of red. As with the 
case of PCs this condition is a covariational (rather than inferential) one, and her 
idiosyncrasy is evidenced by her disposition to apply ‘red’ to an area of the paint-
ing which is not red. As I mentioned in Sect. 1, covariational theorists don’t assume 
that all connections between a concept and the world are constitutive of possession 
of the concept—the relevant ones are those that arise in conditions that are normal 
24 This is illustrated by Nida-Rümelin’s (1998) example of Marianna, whose predicament is just like 
Mary’s except that when she is released from the room what she confronts is not an object whose colour 
she can anticipate, but an array of different-coloured splodges of paint. PC-theorists assume that by look-
ing at a red splodge, she can acquire red* without knowing what colour it corresponds to.
25 Chalmers (2003, pp. 234–254) reflects that judgements invoking ‘direct PCs’—i.e. PCs formed and 
deployed in the immediate introspective presence of their referents—may be infallible. But my interest is 
in judgements invoking ‘standing’ ICs which are not in this way guaranteed to be correct.
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or optimal or whatever—but let’s assume that such conditions obtain in this case 
so that Alice’s use is certainly at odds with the mooted possession condition. The 
anti-individualist claim, then, is that this shortcoming is off-set by her preparedness 
to defer. An individualist would insist that before being corrected, Alice used ‘red’ 
to express an idiosyncratic colour concept (one which includes some orange in its 
extension). But the anti-individualist emphasizes her preparedness to defer and the 
familiar considerations to do with mundane beliefs expressed using ‘red’ to argue 
that we should prefer an anti-individualist attribution to her of red.
Suppose next that when Alice made her judgement about the painting’s colour, 
she also applied an IC (presumably, red*) in a judgement about what it was like to 
see the colour. I suggest that what Ball and Tye are driving at is the suggestion that 
if Alice’s application of red to the painting was an error, then her application of the 
IC to the experience was probably an error too. Here, an individualist would charac-
terize possession of red* in terms (inter alia, perhaps) of a certain introspective rela-
tion to red* (again, modulo the usual qualification about normal/optimal conditions) 
and if Alice misapplied the IC, this is evidence that she failed to meet that condition. 
(Let’s assume that conditions were normal/optimal for application of red* just as we 
assumed they were for application of red.)
Should we agree that Alice probably misapplied red*? I suggest that Alice has 
reason to suspect that she did. It’s likely that she believes that red* experiences are 
typically caused by (or, indeed, are) perceptions of red objects, and so in general 
she’ll expect her applications of red and red* to keep in step. Indeed, it’s likely 
that she’ll endeavour to keep them in step. If Bob convinces her to revise the earlier 
application of red, a revision of her earlier application of red* would be licenced—
indeed, prescribed—by this policy. Against this theoretical setting, it would seem (as 
Tye suggests) irrational for her to revise the earlier application of red without also 
revising her earlier application of red*.
To be sure, we have not yet described a case of Alice deferring to Bob over her 
application of red*—at least not directly. For in the scenario just considered, Alice’s 
reason for revising her application of red* is not a recognition that Bob has a better 
conception of red*’s referent (i.e. of red*). Rather, her reason is the conjunctive one, 
that, first, she expects her applications of red and red* to align, and second, her rec-
ognition of Bob’s authority in regard to the referent of red.
It’s a good question whether we should take a thinker’s inclination to revise an 
earlier application of a concept for this kind of complex, indirect reason to support 
anti-individualism about the concept at issue. I think we probably should; but we can 
pass over that for now, for there is a more direct kind of scenario we can consider 
instead. Suppose that at the time Alice stipulatively introduces ‘red*’ to express her 
IC of (the type) what it’s like (for her) to see red—let’s call this time ‘t1’—she tells 
Bob about this, and he undertakes to follow suit. I.e., (as the PC-theorist will have it) 
at  t1 he undertakes henceforth to use ‘red*’ to express his IC of (the type:) what it’s 
like (for him) to see red. Subsequently, they use the term ‘red*’ in conversations with 
one another. The analysis of this I’ve offered suggests that there’s a precariousness 
to this. The PC-theorist will say that Alice’s post-t1 uses of ‘red*’ refer to the phe-
nomenal quality she was introspectively attending to when she acquired her IC, and 
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that Bob’s uses refer to the quality to which he was introspectively attending when he 
acquired his. For both of them this will have been a time sometime before  t1—let’s 
assume it was the same time, and call it ‘t0’. The PC-theorist can be expected to con-
cede that for all that’s been said, these phenomenal qualities might differ: different 
people might experience colours in different ways. Moreover, even if what it was like 
for Alice at  t0 is the same as what it was like for Bob, their ICs might exhibit a differ-
ent degree of specificity or one of them might not locate the border between red* and 
orange* exactly where the other does. On the other hand, one might reason optimisti-
cally that at the time they acquired their IC(s), what it was like for Alice may well 
have been much the same as what it was like for Bob, and that their concept-forming 
intentions, partitioning etc. were much the same. And in that case, one might sup-
pose, their meanings would align: both would use ‘red*’ to express the same concept. 
Presumably, since they bother to enter into their arrangement with ‘red*’, Alice and 
Bob side with the optimists on this: they assume that their meanings align.
Now we can extend the art gallery story. Suppose Alice made her judgements 
at  t2, and that right after correcting her application of ‘red’, at  t3, Bob goes further, 
and mischievously suggests, ‘I bet you described your colour experience back there 
as “red*”, and that you got that wrong too!’ And Alice might be persuaded by this. 
She might reason to herself that since (as has already been granted) Bob is better 
than her at perceptually distinguishing red from orange, he’s probably also better 
at introspectively distinguishing red* from orange*. Now, making this judgement 
would commit Alice to a certain modesty in regard to her application of an IC, but 
not, I’ll argue, irrationality. Applications of ICs involve memory—in applying red* 
to a current experience, Alice in effect judges that her current experience is phenom-
enally like the one to which she was attending when she acquired red*—and think-
ers recognize that their memories are fallible. In the scenario envisaged above, Alice 
comes at  t3 in effect to believe that at  t2, Bob was better than her at judging whether 
the phenomenal character that he attended to at  t2 was the same as the phenomenal 
character that she attended to at  t0. Now, since the earlier of these experiences was 
Alice’s and the later was Bob’s this may seem like an interpersonal phenomenal 
comparison of a kind that, it seems, no ordinary person could make. But remember: 
both Alice and Bob assume that their meanings align—that at  t0, what it was like for 
Alice was the same as what it was like for Bob. Assuming this alignment, Alice can 
reason that Bob’s comparison of what it was like for him at  t2 with what it was like 
for her at  t0 is just a comparison of what it was like for him at  t2 with what it was 
like for him at  t0. Thus if she accedes to him over the use of ‘red*’, this is modest, 
insofar as it commits Alice to thinking of Bob as better than her at certain (cross-
temporal, memory-involving) phenomenal comparisons; but it does not commit her 
to crediting him with a supernatural-looking talent for interpersonal phenomenal 
comparisons.26
26 The doctrine that we cannot make sense even in principle of interpersonal phenomenal comparisons 
of a kind touched on here is the notorious ‘Frege-Schlick view’. For discussion, see Shoemaker (1982, 
2006, Stalnaker 2006), Stalnaker (1999, 2006) and Block (2007). I lack the space to go into this here, 
but obviously I’m committed to rejection of this strong thesis, even if in the latter part of this paragraph 
I suggest in effect that the idea of interpersonal phenomenal comparisons taken as a matter of course (as 
opposed to in principle) seems more problematic than that of cross-temporal intra-personal phenomenal 
comparisons.
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Here we can also see that Alice’s inclination to defer to Bob over ‘red’ and red 
does not compel her to accept Bob’s correction in regard to ‘red*’. The other way 
she could rationally react to his intervention is to repudiate her optimism about 
meaning alignment. If she’s pretty sure that her  t2 use of ‘red*’ and application of 
red* were correct, she can reason that perhaps she and Bob don’t use ‘red*’ to pick 
out the same phenomenal quality—perhaps, e.g. at  t0, what it was like for him was 
different to what it was like for her, so they acquired different ICs—and on that basis 
she can decline to defer. She might have other reasons for pessimism over alignment. 
E.g. she may be impressed by familiar Cartesian intuitions about the idiosyncrasy of 
phenomenal experience. Even if she does not think it likely that e.g. Bob’s experi-
ences are inverted relative to hers, or that either of them is a zombie, she might, even 
so, think it unlikely that their phenomenal qualities at  t0 were the same. Or she might 
have what she takes to be evidence relevant to this particular case. E.g. past experi-
ence with Bob might suggest to her that while he’s good at discriminating colours, 
he’s less good at consistent application of the policy to keep applications of colour 
concepts and phenomenal colour concepts in step.
So, would thinkers with words for ICs grasp them in the deferential way? The 
answer suggested by the reflections above is that they could do, but they also could 
not. It depends (a) on the degree to which they regard themselves as better (or worse) 
than others at (cross-temporal, memory-involving) phenomenal comparisons, and 
(b) the degree of confidence they have in the assumption that their relevant phenom-
enal experiences are/were like those of their peers. If the quantity (a) is higher than 
(b)—if thinkers are more confident that their introspective applications of ICs are 
more reliable than others’ than they are confident that others have experiences of the 
same phenomenal kinds—then they won’t defer. And in that case, the correct inter-
pretation is the individualist one: they possess idiosyncratic ICs in a way that does 
not involve deference.27
On the other hand, if the quantity (a) is lower than (b)—if thinkers with words 
for ICs are less confident that their introspective IC-involving judgements are better 
than others’ than they are confident that others have experiences of the same phe-
nomenal kinds—then they’ll be prepared, on occasion, to defer. And in that case, 
the familiar Burgean considerations are apt. Perhaps when Alice introduced the term 
‘red*’ at  t1, its reference was fixed to the phenomenal quality she was attending to 
when she formed the concept red*, and perhaps we should favour an individual-
ist construal of the concept she expressed by her first uses thereafter of the term 
‘red*’. But if she is disposed thereafter to defer to Bob over application of the term 
in something like the manner described above, the one-concept interpretation seems 
much more attractive, for all of the familiar reasons. An individualist would charac-
terize her possession of red* in terms of a relation (in normal/optimal conditions) 
to instantiations of red* and she now has reason to believe—so we now have reason 
27 On this view, the concepts are idiosyncratic because their identity depends only on how things are 
with the thinkers themselves, and because distinct thinkers might have distinct ICs. This version of indi-
vidualism does not rule out the possibility that as a matter of (as it were, coincidental) fact, different 
thinkers’ ICs are the same.
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to believe—that at  t2 she failed to satisfy that condition. As usual, an individual-
ist interpretation, according to which the concept she possessed at  t2 was idiosyn-
cratic, is available. Indeed, the remark above about how her initial uses of ‘red*’ 
were probably individualistic confirms the availability of a candidate for this role. 
So if we have reasons to insist that the concepts she and Bob express continue to be 
distinct, the individualist interpretation remains coherent, just as it did in the Mary 
case. But if Alice reasons in anything like the way envisaged above, it’s hard to see 
what those reasons could be.
5  Resolutions
In this final section I clarify and evaluate the ramifications of the version of anti-
individualism about ICs developed above, and revisit the pivotal case of Mary. The 
position we’ve reached is that ICs can be possessed in the deferential way, and they 
can be possessed in the non-deferential way. This view is not disunified and inel-
egant, in the way I suggested at the beginning of the previous section that Veillet’s 
position seems to be: rather it’s a version of anti-individualism. Anti-individualists 
should (and I think do) assume that any concept can be possessed in the non-defer-
ential way, if the possessor is resolute enough. Suppose that when Al is confronted 
by his doctor he digs in his heels and insists that what he meant by ‘arthritis’ was 
most definitely a condition one can have in thighs as well as joints. In that case, I 
take it, we’d opt for the individualist presumption that before the doctor’s interven-
tion, the concept he expressed was tharthritis and not arthritis. Burge’s contention 
is not that concept-possession cannot be individualistic. Rather, it’s that the anti-
individualistic construal is the more plausible, given that thinkers don’t generally 
exhibit this kind of obstinacy—given that they’re generally prepared to defer.28
Perhaps thinkers defer less over ICs than over other concepts. This is what we 
might expect if—as I argued above—they are rarely expressed by ordinary terms 
of natural languages, since the mechanism of deference described by standard 
Burgean anti-individualism is linguistic. But I’ve argued that even if they were only 
expressed by specially-introduced neologisms, thinkers like Alice might well be pre-
pared to defer—and that if there are other cases in which they are not, this will be 
because of their assessments of the quantities (a) and (b) rather than anything to do 
with the special nature of ICs. Since anti-individualism is the view that concepts can 
28 Chalmers (2012, Ch. 6, §9) argues that any term can be used in both deferential and non-deferential 
ways. An anonymous referee for Erkenntnis suggests that advocates of Chalmers’ view have a straight-
forward response to Ball and Tye: even if the relevant terms can be used deferentially, they can also be 
used non-deferentially. We can see here why this would be ineffective as a reply to Ball and Tye. To 
begin with, the thesis they oppose, in the first instance, concerns the conditions necessary for possession 
of certain concepts rather than their linguistic expression. Of course the thesis that certain concepts are 
experience-dependent has a consequence involving linguistic expression—i.e. that relevant concepts can 
(assuming they can be expressed linguistically) be expressed non-deferentially. But as we’ve just seen, 
anti-individualism about these concepts does not dispute this. It’s not about whether it’s possible for 
someone to use ‘red*’ non-deferentially, but rather whether, on balance, we should interpret their ordi-
nary uses as non-deferential.
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be possessed in the deferential way, not that they can only be so possessed, I submit 
that this constitutes a compelling argument for anti-individualism about ICs.
In Sect. 4 my attention was directed mainly at the rarefied case of the stipulated 
neologism, ‘red*’, but there may be reasons to suspect that deferential possession 
of phenomenal contents is more widespread. Above I conceded that even if the 
concepts expressed by terms like ‘red’ are not pure ICs, they might be complexes 
with phenomenal components. And if they are, we might well suppose that when a 
thinker possesses such a concept in the deferential way, this gives him a deferential 
purchase on its phenomenal component. If there were good reasons to deny this—to 
suppose that only the non-phenomenal parts of such a complex content could be def-
erentially possessed—those reasons (or analogues of them) ought to have emerged 
in the course of our reflections on the neologistic case.
To conclude, I return to Mary’s case, for we now have the theoretical resources 
we need to explain why—even if ICs can be (and/or often are) possessed in the def-
erential way as anti-individualists maintain—it remains plausible to regard them as 
experience-dependent.
As emerged in Sect. 2, familiar versions of anti-individualism don’t licence the 
contention that an inclination to defer over the application of a term is sufficient for 
possession of the concept it is normally used to express. Burge emphasises that Al 
is a mostly competent user of ‘arthritis’—and I assume his reason for this is that if 
his use of the term was radically deviant—e.g. if he failed to assent to the sentence, 
‘Arthritis is a disease’—we’d be reluctant to attribute arthritis to him. In the terms 
I introduced in Sect. 2: plausible theories characterize concept-possession in terms 
of (individualistic) referential and/or inferential relations, even if they make the anti-
individualist concession that shortcomings in regard to those are compensable by 
suitable deferential dispositions.
In the previous section I suggested that in general, evaluation of Burgean argu-
ments is a matter of weighing the interpretative intuitions elicited by the relevant 
stories against our commitment to the claim that a given individualist condition is 
(or conditions are) necessary for concept possession. Once again: in the argument 
involving Al, these conditions (mooted to be necessary for possession of arthritis) 
are inferential ones, but in the arguments involving Mary and Alice considered in 
Sects. 3 and 4, the mooted condition (on possession of red*) is a covariational one 
involving the concept’s referent.
And here’s the key point. The argument for anti-individualism about Alice devel-
oped in Sect.  4 is much more persuasive than the one about Mary discussed in 
Sect. 3, because Alice comes much closer to meeting the relevant mooted individu-
alist possession condition than (pre-release) Mary. Recall: the mooted possession 
condition involves an introspective relation (which might be causal or constitutional) 
between the thinker and red* experiences. Alice’s misapplication of ‘red*’ pro-
vides evidence that her relation to red* experiences is not quite the one in terms of 
which an individualist covariational theory would characterize possession of red*, 
but it’s close. She introspectively knows/remembers red* with some degree of accu-
racy, even if not the same accuracy as Bob, and no doubt many of her introspec-
tive applications are correct. In contrast, before her release, Mary comes nowhere 
near to meeting the mooted covariational possession condition: she stands in no 
 D. Byrne 
1 3
introspective relation to red*, since she’s never had a red* experience. To be sure, 
we can assume that Mary knows a lot about red*, and some of the ways in which 
she manifests this knowledge may be evidence that she satisfies various inferential 
conditions which we might take to be partially constitutive of possession of red* (as 
well, no doubt, as of co-referring concepts her possession of which is not in ques-
tion). But neither these nor her inclination to defer seems sufficient to compensate 
for the way she comes nowhere near to meeting the covariational condition. Thus, 
while Alice resembles Al—the thinker who is generally proficient with ‘arthritis’ 
but fails to some degree to meet one relevant mooted individualist possession condi-
tion, Mary is much more like the thinker who appears to fail much more comprehen-
sively to meet the possession conditions an individualist might offer for arthritis, 
e.g. by failing to assent to ‘Arthritis is a disease’.
Another way to bring this out is to compare the concepts enjoyed by Alice and 
Mary to the metalinguistic content that either of them might express with a phrase 
like, ‘the phenomenal quality that people call “red*”’. I mentioned in Sect. 1 that 
it’s crucial to PC-theory that thinkers’ PCs are not descriptive, metalinguistic con-
tents like this (since even by PC-theorists’ lights, an inexperienced subject like Mary 
could have such a concept). And there’s no reason to suppose that the concept Alice 
expresses with ‘red*’ is of this sort. As just observed, she has an introspective mem-
ory, however imperfect, of what it’s like to see red, and even if she and Bob had 
never coined the term, ‘red*’, she’d have the IC, red*. So she could possess red* 
without possessing the metalinguistic concept, and (like anyone else) she could have 
the metalinguistic concept without the IC. In contrast, it’s much harder to be con-
vinced that the concept Mary expresses with ‘red*’ is not simply the metalinguistic 
one, since her only route to the referent of red* is via linguistic deference. In con-
trast to Alice, there’s no way that Mary could possess the concept she uses ‘red*’ 
to express without also possessing the metalinguistic concept, and vice versa. Alice 
could without contradiction think the thought she would express with, ‘perhaps red* 
is not what other people call “red*”’; but it’s hard to see how Mary could think this 
without contradiction.
Metalinguistic contents like these are discussed in the familiar debate over Al 
and arthritis. Anti-individualists urge that an unpalatable consequence of individu-
alism is that it entails that when pre-correction Al uttered mundane sentences like 
‘Arthritis is painful’, he did not express the same first-order beliefs as others do with 
those sentences; but some individualists propose to off-set this with the reflection 
that individualism accommodates the suggestion that Al held closely related and 
widely shared metalinguistic beliefs, e.g. that the condition that others call ‘arthri-
tis’ is painful.29 Anti-individualists reply to this in various ways; but the one I want 
to note here is that an implausible feature of the metalinguistic proposal is how it 
ties the relevant beliefs to particular languages. The point of the proposal was to 
accommodate the attractive assumption that some of Al’s relevant beliefs are shared 
with other thinkers, but the accommodation disappoints by allowing only English 
29 See e.g., Donnellan (1993), Chalmers (2002).
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speakers to share these beliefs, since only English speakers have beliefs about oth-
ers’ uses of the term ‘arthritis’.30
When we spell out the analogue of this debate for the arguments over red*, we 
once again find important differences between the case of Mary and all the rest: in 
particular, the proposal to off-set the implausibility of individualism by reflection on 
available metalinguistic beliefs is more compelling in the Mary case than in that of 
Alice. Here, the prima facie unwelcome consequence of individualism is that when 
pre-release Mary and  t2 Alice say something (‘mundane’) like, ‘Ripe tomatoes cause 
red* experiences’, they don’t express a belief that they share with others; and the 
individualist rejoinder is that we can off-set the prima facie implausibility of this 
with the reflection that they might instead have the belief that ripe tomatoes cause 
experiences with the phenomenal character that others call ‘red*’. In Alice’s case the 
appeal of this rejoinder is compromised just as it was in Al’s by the way in which 
the relevant beliefs can be shared only with speakers of a certain language. Just as 
we want to allow that Al can share beliefs about arthritis with thinkers who don’t use 
the word ‘arthritis’, we should want to allow that Alice can share beliefs about red* 
with thinkers who don’t use the neologism. In contrast, since pre-release Mary’s 
only access to the referent of ‘red*’ is linguistic/deferential, the proposal that she 
shares beliefs with experienced peers who don’t use that term is much less plausible. 
To be sure, we’ve been assuming that Mary is as prepared as Alice to defer; but in 
Mary’s case the deferential inclination is so closely tied to the word ‘red*’ that it’s 
hard to see what more there can be to it than what she’d get by associating ‘red*’ 
with the description, ‘the phenomenal quality that others call “red*”’. Thus, while 
the reflection on metalinguistic beliefs does no more to rehabilitate individualism 
in Alice’s case than it does in Al’s, it suggests a very plausible analysis of Mary’s 
deferential disposition.
All in all, then, the weighing exercises on which I have argued assessments of 
Burgean arguments depend deliver different verdicts in these two cases: they suggest 
that the argument may be effective in Alice’s case, but that in Mary’s it is much less 
so.
Neither Ball, Tye nor Veillet consider prosaic cases like Alice’s in detail and 
so I suspect that if readers of Ball and Tye find their argument against experience-
dependency compelling it is because they assume that if a concept can be possessed 
in the deferential way, then its possession can be entirely deferential—as Mary’s 
would have to be. But I’ve argued that that was never a feature of plausible versions 
of Burgean anti-individualism; and Alice’s story demonstrates as well as any that 
this would be a false dilemma. Concepts can be possessed deferentially while being 
experience-dependent. Anti-individualism about ICs does not entail that there are no 
PCs.
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